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Training and the 
New Industrial Relations
A Strategic Role for Unions
Wolfgang Streeck 
University of Wisconsin-Madison
In the past decade, training seems to have emerged as a core subject 
of what to many promises to become a new type of industrial relations: 
more cooperative and consensual, less adversarial and conflictual, with 
fewer costly power struggles. More and more employers have come to 
accept that a modern economy's competitiveness depends on the skills 
of its labor force. Many union leaders, in turn, no longer object to the 
idea that secure employment at high wages requires above all eco 
nomic competitiveness. To deal with what are perceived as critical skill 
shortages, employers in many countries and industries urge govern 
ments and unions to join them in conceited training offensives. Gov 
ernments, for their part, have moved training to the center of labor 
market policies. As skill formation turns into a central issue of eco 
nomic policy and labor relations, previously opposed group interests 
and the general interest finally seem to converge; distributional conflict 
promises to give way to productive cooperation; and eventually what 
appears to be outdated political antagonism may be displaced by 
peaceful competition for the best ideas on how jointly to organize and 
implement the upskilling of a country's, industry's, or company's labor 
force.
Still, few unions have yet thought through the implications of the 
resurgence of training as an industrial relations issue for their own 
strategy and status. Beyond general acknowledgments of the impor 
tance of skill formation, there is considerable skepticism and suspi 
cion, especially about the intentions of employers. Among many 
unionists, memories of the destruction of the craft tradition under mass 
production in the name of economic necessity and rationality are still
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vivid. More recently, unions in many places have observed an indus 
trial restructuring process that was above all aimed at "doing more 
with less"—less labor, that is. The training efforts that accompanied 
this were too often intimately linked with downsizing, speed-up, 
unemployment, and intensification of work to offer strategic promise 
from a union perspective. Moreover, the frequent and conspicuous 
emphasis on "social" and "attitudinal" skills, especially in firms and 
sectors that have gone through the trauma of downsizing, is bound to 
raise suspicions that employers' real objective in training is the restora 
tion of unquestioned managerial prerogative. And are there not enough 
cases where "retraining" or "further training" are no more than a cover 
for outright de-skilling? Or where alleged skill needs in fact serve to 
justify the reintroduction of discretionary wage differentials?
In the burgeoning "new industrial relations" rhetoric (for a more 
moderate version, see Heckscher 1988), all of this alleged to have 
changed recently. Employers are said to "need" high skills—as well as 
"good industrial relations" in a participatory work organization 
because of fundamental changes in their competitive environment. As 
markets and technology allegedly force employers into high-wage and 
high-skill production—turning them into "good employers" as a matter 
of economic self-interest—the implication seems to be that there is no 
longer a need for unions to impose benevolent labor practices through 
mobilization and application of collective political power. Now it is 
suggested, and not just by traditional unions foes, that unions can and 
should instead concentrate their efforts on the implementation of such 
changes as economic restructuring, modernization, and flexibility, 
thereby finally taking on productive rather than merely distributive 
functions and moving from conflict to cooperation as their main new 
source of influence and organizational status.
Union reluctance to embrace tripartite cooperation on training as a 
central new industrial relations subject ultimately derives from its 
unclear implications for the role of unions and the structure of indus 
trial relations in general. In the following, I wish to argue that popular 
images of a harmonious "new industrial relations" based on common 
interests in high skills are dangerously simplistic—mixing truths and 
delusions, profound insights and business school rhetoric, in an almost 
perfect melange. The principal flaw here is a misconstrued relationship 
between productive cooperation and distributive conflict, or between
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cooperative policy and adversarial politics, suggesting that the benevo 
lent market pressures that give rise to "flexible specialization" signal 
the obsolescence of struggles over and for power. This is not just a mis 
reading of the evidence which, as will be illustrated in more detail, 
supports the old insight that conflict and cooperation not only do not 
preclude, but often in fact presuppose, each other. In addition, by 
implying that unions that care about productive concerns can be no 
more than agents of management-determined economic necessities, it 
also deters unions from constructive and creative rethinking of present, 
primarily distributional policies. The point I would like to make here is 
that one can fully agree with the proposition that unions should 
embrace skill formation as the centerpiece of a new, cooperative, and 
productivistic strategy, and at the same time insist on unions' need for 
a strong, independent power base giving them, just as in the past, a 
capacity to impose rules and obligations on employers that they would 
not voluntarily obey or accept. I will argue that the latter no less than 
the former is in fact an indispensable condition for a successful joint 
union-management strategy of industrial upskilling, even from the per 
spective of governments and employers. To do this, I begin with a brief 
general discussion of the relationship between unionism and the sphere 
of production.
Unions and the Supply Side
Mainstream unions in the postwar period have almost universally 
conceived of themselves as agents of distributive and redistributive 
politics, not of production. As such, they were reluctant to discuss their 
activities in terms of their impact on, or their contribution to, efficiency 
and productivity—and indeed usually such discussions were forced 
upon them by employers, conservative governments, and hostile aca 
demics. Nevertheless, the ideological self-stylization of unions as 
exclusively devoted to distributive concerns, 1 enabling them to decline 
direct responsibility for the well-being of national economies and indi 
vidual enterprises, was not only historically new but also factually 
incorrect. This was because, through their very concentration on distri 
bution, unions in the Keynesian-Fordist world of postwar Social
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Democracy contributed to economic performance both by more or less 
explicitly accepting managerial prerogative at the workplace, and by 
helping stabilize aggregate demand and increase the economy's pro 
pensity to spend at the macro level. In fact, unions' very power in dis 
tributive politics was conditional on the productive functions that their 
emphasis on distribution performed for the economy as a whole; and it 
was only because of these that unionism could come to be regarded by 
governments and employers as serving not only particularistic but also 
general interests.2
Today the Keynesian configuration is history (Skidelski 1979). For 
many reasons, the critical problems of the economy have migrated 
from the macro to the micro level, from the demand to the supply side, 
from the amount of output to its structure—and from distribution to 
production. In the process modern unionism has been thrown into dis 
array. Having comfortably located themselves in the distributive poli 
tics of macroeconomic demand management, unions are now faced 
with an apparently irreversible breakdown of the felicitous conver 
gence of particularistic interest representation and the promotion of the 
general interest that had in the Keynesian period sustained both their 
institutional position and the economy.
Why do unions typically have such a hard time asserting themselves 
in the changed political economy of the 1980s and 1990s? The supply 
side has been called the "kingdom of the bourgeoisie" (Przeworski and 
Wallerstein 1982, p. 59). At first glance, production requires above all 
cooperation and compliance, not conflict and resistance. Likewise, 
structural change and industrial adjustment have to be responsive to 
market conditions; if they are driven or constrained by distributional 
politics, the result is all-too-often disastrous. Moreover, unlike the 
demand side which is governed by politicians, the supply side and the 
microeconomics of individual enterprises are run by managers; while 
politicians are subject to a similar set of incentives and strategic imper 
atives as union leaders, and therefore are often sympathetic with them, 
managers are not. Also, the micro level is a world, not only of diverse 
conditions in different sectors and workplaces, but also of competitive 
market pressures. Unions that get entangled in these may lose their 
capacity to impose general rules on the economy as a whole, find their 
internal politics and their organizations fragmented by divergent mem 
ber interests, and run the risk of being torn apart by identification of
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their members with the competitive needs and interests of their 
employers.
Not that there was, even in an orthodox view, no place at all for 
unions in an economy driven from its supply side. Today unions are 
again and again invited to "cooperate" with management in restructur 
ing, in rebuilding competitiveness, improving quality, increasing pro 
ductivity, and other efforts. But typically such cooperation is not meant 
to entail much more than union leaders explaining to their membership 
why it is necessary to comply with whatever management determines 
is required—for example, more training and retraining. The rewards 
held out for such cooperation are improved economic performance, 
with an uncertain share of the benefits accruing to union members, and 
perhaps management absention from trying to break unions and run the 
workplace unilaterally. Indeed not a small number of union officials all 
over the western world today pursue cooperative policies for exactly 
these reasons, and for no others. Correspondingly, unions in stronger 
industries or with a more secure organizational base often prefer not to 
get involved in a kind of cooperation that seems to offer them essen 
tially no other role than that of subordinate agents of management- 
determined economic, or "strategic," necessities.
Drawing on training as my example, I argue that just as in the past 
on the demand side, there are today on the supply side numerous 
opportunities for unions to combine independent, powerful representa 
tion of member interests with a pursuit of general social and economic 
interests. Exploring such opportunities indeed requires cooperative 
policies and strategies. But the type of cooperation needed here is far 
from passive acceptance of managerial decisions or self-limitation of 
unions to the implementation of them. Quite to the contrary, forceful 
intervention in, and regulation of, managerial behavior are required, 
with unions potentially and eventually appropriating, through collec 
tive political action, a significant share of the responsibility for produc 
tive performance. This is so, and indeed cooperation is necessary in the 
sense that it is competitively superior to managerial unilateralism, 
because the supply side of a modern industrial economy is a kingdom 
of the bourgeoisie only on the surface. In reality, it is rather a magic 
kingdom full of paradoxes and contradictions, the most important of 
which is that the king cannot properly govern, either in his own interest 
or in that of his subjects, unless he is himself governed by these—a
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king who needs to be constrained by a powerful citizenry in order to be 
able to accomplish what he would like to accomplish; a king, as a pris 
oner of his passions, faces dilemmas that he can solve only if he is 
compelled to do so by others.
Skills and Effective Supply
Union involvement in skill formation may well be the successor in 
the post-Keynesian political economy to what wage formation was for 
unions under Keynesianism, being as important and performing the 
same functions for them. Understanding the politics and institutional 
dynamics of training constitutes a major step towards a theory of effec 
tive supply to succeed older theories of effective demand, and may help 
unions adjust their position in the political economy to new conditions 
and realities. In training as well as, before, in demand stabilization, the 
possibility for unions to perform a useful function for both their mem 
bers and the society at large derives from the fact that their oppo 
nents—capitalists or management—are confronted with vexing 
dilemmas between their collective long-term and their individual 
short-term interests. In the Keynesian world, this was the dilemma 
between the need for high and stable purchasing power and the desire 
to cut costs. The solution was cooperation between employers, forced 
upon them by unions through the exercise of collective power in indus 
trial conflict, and often also by governments through legal intervention. 
More specifically, unions imposed on employers a more or less uni 
form and rigid wage pattern, thereby taking wages out of competition 
and insuring investors against the downward spirals in purchasing 
power that may result from competitive cost-cutting. In this way, col 
lective action of workers created the stable and growing product mar 
kets that enterprises in the era of mass production needed to invest and 
grow.
In a market economy, training poses similar problems for employers 
on the supply side to that of aggregate demand stabilization on the 
demand side, and it offers similar opportunities to unions to build a 
base of independent power. What wage bargaining was for distribu 
tional unionism, training may become for unions working on and
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through the production side of the economy and making their peace 
with it: an opportunity for conflictual cooperation, or cooperation 
through conflict; for redistribution in the general interest; and for deep 
involvement of unions in the management of an advanced industrial 
economy and society. In short, this is because:
1. In certain growing but highly competitive product markets, a rich 
supply of skills, and especially of broad, experientially based general 
work skills, constitutes perhaps the most important source of competi 
tive advantage for firms.
2. The skills that are most needed in such markets are of a kind that 
can be generated only with the active involvement of employers. This 
is because such skills are most likely to be generated through work- 
based learning in close proximity to the work process, and clearly not 
in schools.
3. While the acquisition of today's critical skills requires the utiliza 
tion of workplaces for nonwork purposes, most employers, if left to 
their own devices, will not do enough for skill formation, in part 
because of individually unsolvable problems of calculating expected 
returns on investment, and in part because in an open labor market 
skills are, in an important sense, collective, or public, goods (Becker 
1975).
4. Unions, if properly supported by public policy, have the capacity 
to make employers train, and may well develop the motivation to do 
so.
I have elaborated these points elsewhere (Streeck 1989). For the 
present purpose, I would like to confine myself to a few selective 
observations.
The Relationship Between Modern Technology, 
Work Organization, and Skills
Modern technology is less than instructive with respect to the skills 
needed to operate it (Brodner 1990; OECD 1988). The reason is that 
microelectronic circuitry can support radically different patterns of 
work organization. Vastly increased capacities to process and transmit 
information allow for centralization of control and differentiation of 
tasks far beyond what has been possible only a decade ago. At the 
same time, they also enable organizations to delegate decisions to flex-
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ible subunits with integrated, overlapping functions, so as to respond 
better to more complex and specific demands from their environment.
Different patterns of work organization give rise to different skill 
needs. A centralized and functionally differentiated organization 
requires a small number of highly skilled employees located in staff- 
like departments remote from the actual production process, and a 
large number of unskilled or semiskilled operators with narrowly spe 
cialized tasks waiting to be eliminated by automation. By comparison, 
a decentralized and functionally integrated work organization will 
have short hierarchies and will require a relatively even distribution of 
skills.
Beliefs about a trend towards upgrading work in modern production 
systems, about urgent needs for improvements in initial and further 
training, about a "skill gap" in the workforce, or about skills as a cru 
cial resource for international competitiveness are all premised on the 
assumption that in the future, most productive work will be done in 
less centralized and less functionally differentiated organizations. To 
the extent that firms will be compelled to exploit the potential of 
microelectronic information technology for decentralizing and reinte 
grating work tasks, it is argued that they will have to rely on a large 
supply among their workforce of a combination of cognitive-technical, 
attitudinal, and social skills that together form the basis for what may 
be called "decentralized competence"—where competence means both 
the organizational autonomy and the individual ability of workers to 
make correct and responsible decisions embedded in and related to the 
context of the organization at large.
The Relationship Between Product Markets, 
Product Strategies, and Productive Flexibility
While the skill needs of employers using new technology depend on 
how employers choose to organize work, that choice, in turn, is related 
to the product market in which a firm operates. Decentralized compe 
tence seems to be particularly conducive to, or outright required for, 
small-batch production or customized production of goods or services 
designed to fit the specific needs of individual clients. This is because 
decentralized competence provides organizations with a high degree of 
internal flexibility in general and a capacity for fast retooling in panic-
Training and the New Industrial Relations 175
ular, i.e., for switching from one product, or batch of products, to 
another.
Producing a diverse and changing range of products at a high qual 
ity level requires not only a strong engineering capacity that allows for 
a high rate of product innovation. It also demands close interaction 
between the organization and its customers, as well as between differ 
ent organizational functions such as marketing and product engineer 
ing, or product engineering and production. For this to be possible, 
employees in different parts of the organization must be able to under 
stand each other's job, and sometimes to substitute for one another. 
That is, their qualifications must overlap (Gustavsen 1986). Moreover, 
rapid product change is facilitated by work groups integrating, like 
small firms, a wide range of tasks and thereby becoming more inde 
pendent from concurrent decisions or supporting activities of differen 
tiated, functionally specialized units. This calls for duplication of skills 
across organizational subunits. Productive flexibility thus necessitates 
redundant (i.e., overlapping or duplicated) organizational capacities 
that can be economically sustained only if other overheads, like quality 
control, supply management, or worker supervision, are cut—which 
again demands integration of previously separate, specialized tasks in 
front-line production work.
Overall, it appears that today's product markets place a premium on 
customization (Piore and Sabel 1984), and that firms that are flexible 
enough to engage in small-batch or customized production can com 
mand higher profit margins, are less vulnerable in their market posi 
tion, and are likely to enjoy more long-term stability. Ultimately, this is 
based on the experience that in the highly competitive 1970s and 1980s 
firms, or national economies, that were capable of offering more diver 
sified and customized products fared better than more traditional pro 
ducers of standardized mass products. There is some disagreement as 
to why this should have been the case, to what extent product markets 
have really changed, and how large the new markets for what has been 
called "diversified quality production" (Streeck 1991) actually are. 
What seems clear, however, is that the economic attraction for employ 
ers of small-batch or customized production is often conditional on the 
prevailing wage level in a given country or region—firms that can 
bring down their wages far enough may have the alternative to survive 
as mass producers. The problem is that in a more and more global
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economy, mass markets tend to be increasingly taken over by produc 
ers from newly industrializing countries where wages are so low that 
firms in old industrial countries may, for all kinds of reasons, find it 
impossible to compete.3
In addition, it seems that the distinction between mass and custom 
ized markets is more fluid than is often believed. Given the productive 
flexibilities made possible by information technology, especially in 
combination with a work organization that emphasizes decentralized 
competence, small-batch producers and customizers are often able to 
transform mass markets into markets for more customized products, as 
mass producers in the course of industrialization transformed craft 
markets into mass markets. This is because high productive flexibility 
makes it possible to narrow the cost differential between customized, 
or semicustomized, and mass production to a point where the (still) 
higher price of nonstandardized goods or services is compensated by 
their better match of the customer's individual needs. To the extent that 
advances in customized and semicustomized production methods 
make this possible, mass markets shrink and differentiated quality mar 
kets grow.
In sum, as product markets fragment, the market a firm serves 
becomes increasingly subject to "strategic choice." Simultaneously, as 
technologies become more undefined and malleable, the products that 
are produced with them, and the organization of work that surrounds 
them, are less determined than in the past by a technology's intrinsic 
properties; they, too, have to be strategically chosen. Given existing 
technologies and demand structures, a firm can in principle aspire to be 
either a quality-competitive producer of customized goods with a flexi 
ble, fluid, and decentralized work organization, employing highly 
skilled workers at a high wage, or an efficient price-competitive pro 
ducer of standardized goods with a centralized and formalized organi 
zational structure, unskilled labor, low wages, and high-wage 
dispersion (see Carnevale 1991; CSAW 1990).
The Institutional Sources of Skill Use 
and Skill Development
The long controversy on the direction of skill development under 
capitalism can now by and large be considered settled. Whether or not
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employers prefer de-skilled over skilled labor cannot, in Bravermanian 
fashion, be decided deductively and once and for all. The question can 
sensibly be answered only when placed in the context of wage-setting 
mechanisms, the regulation of employment contracts, patterns of work 
organization, styles of technology use, and firms' strategic product 
market decisions (Sorge and Warner 1988). Tbday managerial choices 
between downskilling and upskilling are clearly not driven by technol 
ogy as such; microelectronic circuitry can be used for cutting costs by 
eliminating skills and human intervention, as well as for increasing 
product quality and variety by enriching the productive capacities of 
well-trained workers. Downskilling presupposes, among other things, 
downward flexibility and wide dispersion of wages, enabling employ 
ers to adjust wages to relatively declining labor productivity, as well as 
high numerical flexibility of employment, permitting rapid adjustment 
of labor input to market fluctuations and making it unnecessary to pro 
vide for workers' internal redeployability through training. By compar 
ison, rigid and high wages, an egalitarian wage structure, limited 
access of firms to external labor markets, and limitations on the 
deployment of new technology for "rationalization"—by making it 
impossible for firms to be profitable in mass markets for standardized, 
price-competitive products and forcing them to try and serve differen 
tiated, quality-competitive markets—tend to forbid downskilling and 
instead induce firms to raise the skill level of their workforce.
The Importance and the Difficult Economics 
of Work-Based Learning
Consensus is growing that today's advanced work skills are best 
acquired at or near the workplace (for the United States, see OTA 
1990). Workplace-based training, where it is up to its new task, is quite 
different from traditional on-the-job training. Its task is to impart, for 
the mass of the workforce subject to easy, flexible hiring and firing, 
cheap, narrow, workplace-specific skills supplementing the general 
skills produced in public educational institutions. The growing need to 
use the workplace for training purposes is related to the fact that with 
fast-changing and highly flexible technology, and with fast product 
turnover, work routines can never become so established that execu 
tion can be neatly separated from conception. Work in such environ-
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ments amounts to continuous experimentation with, and permanent 
"debugging" of, new processes and machine setups. On the part of 
operators, this requires, in addition to high cognitive skills (literacy 
and numeracy), an intuitive feel for the work that can only be gained 
from experience, as well as a range of motivational, attitudinal, and 
social skills that cannot be adequately developed outside "real work" 
production situations with their pressures and constraints. This is one 
reason why countries like Japan and Germany, where most industrial 
skill formation takes place in work settings, are so advantaged by their 
human capital endowment. Put in more general terms, the skills 
required for advanced industrial competitiveness are most likely to be 
available where it is possible to transform the workplace into a place of 
learning in addition to a place of work (i.e., to place a large share of the 
training burden on firms and managements and make them accept the 
utilization of the enterprise not just for production but also for skill for 
mation).
Mainstream labor economics proceeds from the seminal insight that 
in an open labor market, returns on investment in general skills cannot 
be internalized by individual firms since such skills are transferable 
from one employer to another. This is why such skills will not be pro 
duced unless the costs are borne by the worker as an individual or as a 
taxpayer (i.e., in the latter case, by the general public). Keeping expen 
diture on and responsibilities for general and specific skills apart is 
greatly simplified if general skills are taught outside the workplace in 
specialized training organizations—schools—while specific skills are 
generated at the workplace. To the extent that the workplace is used to 
produce general skills, which is not likely to be typical, workers must 
be willing to accept a pay cut equivalent to the cost of the general train 
ing they receive, or the government must reimburse employers for their 
expenses. The first solution presupposes that general training can 
indeed be paid for out of a share of a worker's wage during the training 
period; both assume that the costs and returns of training at the work 
place can be reliably established.
All these assumptions have come under heavy pressure. As has been 
pointed out, there is for a variety of reasons a fundamental school fail 
ure with respect to the formation of general work skills. As a result, to 
the extent that an economy depends for its competitiveness on high 
skills, a growing share of its general training effort has to be carried out
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at its workplaces. Typically, the costs of such training are high and can 
be recovered by individual employers only over a long period far 
exceeding the time of training, and with some reasonable commitment 
by workers not to move to another employer. The benefits of work 
place training for employers inevitably become vulnerable to being 
pirated by competitors. Unlike previous types of market failure, this 
problem cannot be remedied by unilateral public provision, since that 
fails to produce the desired type of skills.
Moreover, the exact costs of workplace training defy conventional 
accounting and can therefore not easily be reimbursed. Workplace 
learning is optimally effective in a group-based or team-centered work 
organization that is more open and "porous" than what traditional 
industrial engineering prescribes. While this may in one sense increase 
costs, or at least make costs less easy to detect, it may at the same time 
engender quality improvements and productivity increases. To this 
extent, workplace training may pay for itself. In any case, an offer by 
the public sector to pay employers for general training at the workplace 
is likely to encourage all kinds of "creative accounting." Also, employ 
ers may feel induced to rely on more traditional, classroom-style train 
ing, the costs of which are easier to establish. The inevitable 
conclusion is that adequate utilization of the workplace as a learning 
site requires that employers pay a significant share of the costs of gen 
eral training.
The difficult economics of workplace training require public inter 
vention of a kind that makes unilateral provision look simple by com 
parison. The assumption by employers of responsibility for training in 
workplace-unspecific skills, as appears optimal for competitive perfor 
mance, demands effective imposition of social obligations to train, as 
a substitute for insufficient individual market incentives and as a way 
of taking training costs out of competition. In open labor markets, 
employers competing with each other will always be under a tempta 
tion to "cheat" by not investing in general training and hiring skilled 
workers from their competitors. What is more, the mere prospect that 
others may behave in this way is likely to deter employers from train 
ing even if the result will be a general skill shortage. Societies that 
have at their disposal institutional or cultural mechanisms by which to 
oblige firms to cooperate in training are likely to enjoy competitive 
advantages as they will be able to protect their firms from the dysfunc-
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tional consequences of market-rational behavior for the production of 
skills as collective goods. The governance of workplace training, like 
that of workplace relations and the employment contract in general, is 
best assigned to legally supported and facilitated joint regulation 
between management and labor at the point of production. The same 
reasons that speak for collective bargaining as an alternative to both 
managerial unilateralism and direct government intervention in the 
workplace also speak for an orderly sharing of responsibility for gov 
erning the workplace as a place of learning.
Union Policies on Training: From 
Consumption to Investment
Unions in advanced industrial countries differ widely in their atti 
tudes towards training. The spectrum extends from outright hostility 
among radical unions of unskilled workers (as in parts of the Commu 
nist French CGT), to indifferent lip service to the idea of shared, public 
responsibility for skill upgrading; and to long-standing support for, and 
involvement in, initial and continuous training (e.g., in Denmark or 
Germany). However, even where unions have accepted training as a 
current concern, there usually is still a long way to embracing it as a 
core subject of union strategy.
This is not only because there is a temptation for unions that support 
training to do so in the traditional framework of distributive politics, 
conceiving of training as a basically consumptive nonwage benefit. 
More important, training tends to be regarded by many unionists as an 
investment employers make out of economic self-interest, as required 
by technology and product market conditions. To this, the principal 
modus operand! of unionism—the creation of entitlements for work 
ers—does not seem to apply. As long as it is assumed that "employers 
know what they are doing" (i.e., that product market signals are suffi 
ciently instructive for employers to "do what is needed" on training), 
there is simply no reason for unions as unions to expend scarce bar 
gaining power on making employers train. For this to make sense, 
union confidence in employers' ability to act with economic rationality 
must be less than complete. An active union policy on training, in other 
words, presupposes that the limited capacities of the self-proclaimed
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king of the supply side to act in his own interest are thoroughly appre 
ciated.4
A positive union policy on training may also take off from the 
insight that advanced skills require investment not just by employers 
but also by workers, and that such investment is indeed more likely if 
supported by negotiated entitlements—albeit, of course, to invest 
rather than consume. More generally, the opening for unions becoming 
agents of a more-than-distributive training policy lies in the incom 
pleteness, as it were, of the human resource investment functions of 
both employers and workers—being due to a lack of resources on the 
part of the latter, and the inherent limits of rational return-on-invest- 
ment calculations for the provision of work-based training in high, 
broad, experiential skills on the part of the former. Here as elsewhere, 
gaps in the instructive capacity of product markets and technology 
have to be filled, and conflicts between individual and collective ratio 
nality overcome, by institutional rules and social norms enabling ratio 
nal economic actors to act in their rational economic interest
Union Intervention in Training
Independent union intervention in cooperative training and human 
resource policies must combine the imposition of institutional con 
straints on managements that foreclose low-skill, low-wage paths of 
industrial adjustment, with the creation of institutional opportunities 
for managements to pursue successfully a high-skill and high-wage 
policy. Constraints and opportunities must be built simultaneously; 
while the former without the latter suffocates economic performance, 
the latter without the former results in a dual economy with widely 
divergent conditions and performance levels, and very likely an under- 
utilization of productive opportunities due to unchecked temptations 
for employers to defect from more demanding high-skill and high- 
wage production patterns.
How specifically unions can deploy their political and organiza 
tional capacities to build the constraints and opportunities required to 
make employers train, and what those constraints and opportunities 
could be in a given economic and political setting, depends on the situ-
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ation and, of course, the creativity of the actors involved.5 What can 
generally be said is that cooperation on training is not only compatible 
with conflict, but indeed may require a conflictual capability of unions 
for its success. Examples where rigorous pursuit of, in part quite tradi 
tional, union objectives—if necessary against employer resistance— 
complements and makes effective a cooperative strategy on training 
are:6
1. Defense of high wages and a relatively flat wage structure, so as 
to foreclose the option of low-wage, low-skill employment. High and 
downwardly rigid wages force employers to raise the productivity of 
their workers to match the given price of their labor, rather than 
depress wages to the level of workers' given marginal productivities. 
The more flexible the wage, the lower the interest of employers in 
training. The higher the wage spread, the more selective employers' 
training investment will be.7 Given the inherent indeterminacy of skill 
needs and the benefits of a rich skill environment for advanced com 
petitiveness, highly selective and targeted human resource investment 
is, almost by definition, likely to be economically suboptimal.
2. Insistence on obligatory, standardized workplace training curric 
ula that firms have to follow if they want to train for a particular skill or 
occupation. These curricula must be broadly defined, so as to prevent 
overspecialization and provide the ground for future, further training. 
Standardized curricula also serve the important function of enabling 
workers to quit and carry their skills with them. This ability constitutes 
a major source of union and worker power that can be defended only if 
training regimes are centralized.8 Moreover, by barring employers 
from generating skills that are too workplace-specific, generally bind 
ing curricula provide the constraint as well as the opportunity to pro 
duce exactly the kind of broad, polyvalent skills that they need most.
3. Use of the union workplace organization, or whatever structure of 
worker representation may exist at the workplace, to ensure that train 
ing follows the standardized curriculum and neither becomes too 
workplace-specific nor is absorbed in productive work. Without an 
effective, on-the-ground enforcement mechanism, unions and workers 
cannot live with a high differential between training and skilled wages. 
Effective union supervision of workplace training, ensuring that it 
remains just that, is an important safeguard against the temptation for
Training and the New Industrial Relations 183
management to extract more productive work from trainees, thereby 
neglecting their firm's own longer-term interests.
4. Defense, or extension, of legal and other provisions that protect 
employment continuity and stability. Employers who can satisfy their 
skill needs and change the skill composition of their workforce by fir 
ing old and hiring new workers will have less incentive to train than 
employers who face fewer employment rigidities. An economy where 
employers have the option of turning to the external labor market for 
skills, instead of training or retraining their existing workforce, will 
tend to suffer from a general skill deficit This is so not least since the 
expectation on the part of employers that their competitors will seek 
external rather than internal adjustment constitutes a strong disincen 
tive to train, even in periods of obvious skill shortages and even for 
firms that feel severely constrained by these.
5. Imposition of a flat wage regime with the few wage grades and 
job classifications, which rewards knowledge rather than activities per 
formed. Wage structures of this kind allow for easy redeployment of 
workers, which affords firms a degree of internal flexibility that makes 
the constraints of external employment rigidity bearable. Even more 
important, with the right kind of pay system workers will not only be 
willing to acquire skills but will also accept internal mobility—in part 
because it helps them learn.9
6. Active pursuit, as an objective in its own right, of an anti-Tay- 
lorist policy of work organization, aimed at imposing on employers 
negotiated obligations to move towards broad job descriptions, a low 
division of labor, long work cycles, and reintegration of tasks. In addi 
tion to improving working conditions, such a policy contributes to 
making low-skilled labor unusable by eliminating the type of jobs for 
which it was in the past typically hired. Coupled with external employ 
ment rigidities and internal employment flexibility, de-Taylorization of 
work organization thus constrains as well as induces employers to 
invest in training. 10
7. Negotiation of training and retraining plans with employers, set 
ting a mutually agreed human resource policy for enterprises, regions, 
or industries. Such agreements would have to create enforceable enti 
tlements for workers to be trained and retrained at the workplace on a 
current basis, not just in emergencies, and under general as well as 
workplace-unspecific curricula. Given that firms lack instructive eco-
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nomic criteria as to what kind of skills and how many they need; and 
given the advantages quality-competitive firms, industries, and regions 
derive from a rich supply of excess skills, there will be ample space to 
accommodate egalitarian demands for underendowed groups in the 
workforce to be included in training. In fact, it will be through negoti 
ated entitlements to learn at work that unions will contribute most to 
the broad and unspecific skill formation that firms in demanding mar 
kets need but find so hard to generate on their own.
A Strategic Perspective?
Unions today have a unique chance to return in a productive way to 
their craft heritage (Piore 1986). Craft unions were producers of skills 
as well as sellers. Up to the present day, there are industries in the 
United States where high standards of training at the workplace, and 
indeed the very provision of such training, depend on strong craft 
union presence and disappear with the decline of unionization.
But it is also true that in their distributional battles with Braverma- 
nian employers, craft unions often redefined skill in terms of exclusive 
rights of their members to narrowly demarcated jobs. 11 In that process, 
unions' contribution to the production of skills began to take second 
place to the defense of craft prerogatives. Where craft unionism, or 
important elements of it, survived, it all-too-often deteriorated, under 
the pressure of employers' de-skilling strategies, into a reactive 
defense of status and privilege. In such cases training lost its produc- 
tivist meanings: at the worst, it became reserved for small groups of 
carefully selected apprentices, with restricted access serving to main 
tain a high differential between skilled and unskilled wages, and turned 
into an increasingly well-paid, waiting period for accession to the labor 
aristocracy, without much of a meaningful curriculum. 12 This, in turn, 
made it easier for employers to attack unions as special interest groups 
impeding both industrial progress and fair access to good jobs. De- 
unionization and the destruction of apprenticeship can thus be pre 
sented by employers as efficient as well as equitable.
In a perverse alliance, then, industrial employers bent on de-skilling 
and craft unions narrowly representing only their members, often
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enough played into each other's hands. The dismal results were unhap 
pily reinforced when industrial unionism appeared and found in de- 
skilling the promise of a homogeneous workforce easy to organize in 
inclusive unions around distributional concerns and without entangle 
ment in the sphere of production. This configuration prepared the 
ground for the postwar compromise between capital and labor, in 
which the latter agreed to leave production to management and accom 
plish its egalitarian objectives through distributive collective bargain 
ing and social policy. With the ascent of Fordism, training was no 
longer much of a concern.
There is nothing in the present return of skills onto the industrial 
relations agenda that would compel unions to give up the egalitarian 
values they inherited from industrial unionism. In fact, in a world in 
which redundant skills may be necessary for competitive economic 
success, the two traditions of unionism may now be able to converge in 
a policy of negotiated general upskilling, conducted and enforced in 
cooperative conflict with employers and in creative partnership with 
governments, and indeed much facilitated by the internal organiza 
tional dynamics of industrial unionism. Who will be king on the supply 
side is far from being a foregone conclusion.
NOTES
*I am grateful to Joel Rogers for constructive comment. The usual disclaimers apply.
1. In reality, of course, the matter was more complicated. In all western countries in the post 
war period, there were sporadic demands by unions for involvement in managerial decisions. 
Mainstream unionists typically had a hard time deciding if these were a right-wing sellout to cap 
ital, or a Communist attack on the market economy and, with it, free collective bargaining. The 
mainstream Nur-Gewerkschqfter, to use Marx's term, hated both. To keep his distance from the 
inscrutable ambivalence and the puzzling political contradictions of productivism, right or left, he 
would insist that the union's proper concern was fundamentally different from management's; that 
the two were confounded only at the union's and, perhaps, the economy's and democracy's peril; 
and that while management was in charge of efficiency, or economic issues, the union was to look 
after equity, or the social questions. Coexisting with this strand of unionism were other, older stra 
tegic orientations that sometimes looked "cooperative," or "yellow," and sometimes "radical," or 
"red." Their difference from mainstream centrism was that they sought an active role for unions in 
the efficient organization of production. In some countries, these in fact became the mainstream: 
the "left" version in Sweden, the "right" version in Japan, and a peculiar blend of the two in Ger 
many (viz. that chameleon-like institution, codetermination). The matter is made even more con 
fusing by the fact that rhetoric and behavior did not always coincide, so that one found, for 
example, distribution-minded centrists supporting wage moderation in the name of economic 
growth.
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2. For the workplace, Freeman and Medoff (1984) have produced econometric evidence that 
unions, even in the United States and in contradiction of received wisdom, increase productivity. 
For more recent confirmation, see Mishel and Voos (1991).
3. Firms in high-wage areas that do not want, or are unable, to develop productive flexibility 
may also, of course, relocate to low-wage countries.
4. Again, this does not appear to be a clear-cut left-right issue. Confidence in the superior eco 
nomic wisdom of owners and managers can be found both among "cooperative" unionists for 
whom cooperation consists of rallying their members behind management-defined economic 
inevitabilities, and among "arms-length," "adversarial" opponents of cooperation who want to 
confine unions exclusively to extracting distributive concessions. The latter position implies that 
the economic basis for such concessions can be safely produced and reproduced without union 
"involvement," i.e., by management acting on its own.
5. A different but related question that I will not address here is how unions with weak or 
declining organizational capacities, for example in the United States, can use involvement in skill 
formation to build or protect such capacities. Much depends in this respect on whether employers, 
and perhaps the state, perceive existing skill deficits as so critical, and their own means to deal 
with them as so limited, that they are willing to pay a political price to whoever may be able and 
willing to help them out. This would imply that if unions could come up with an effective contri 
bution to skill formation that only they can make (or that they can make better than others), they 
could in principle "sell" that contribution in the same way and for the same kind of returns as they 
have in the past sold their more traditional "product"—peace at the workplace. As Joel Rogers 
reminds me, unions thrive if their policies satisfy three conditions: they must be advantageous to 
their members and possible members; they must give employers something that they want, but 
cannot get on their own; and they must make a visible contribution to the "common good." Pro 
motion of effective skill formation, especially at the workplace, may very well do all of the above.
6. As will easily be recognized, my list draws in large measure on the German experience 
(Hilton 1991; Lane 1989; Streeck et al. 1987). However, this is only because I happen to know 
that experience better than others. To the extent that there may be lessons from the German case 
for other countries, these would consist of a number of general principles rather than concrete 
institutional cookbook recipes. I believe that most of those principles have to do with the insuffi 
ciency of a market mode of skill formation; the crucial importance of using the workplace as a 
place of learning; the dangers of off-loading training to the state; the need, resulting from this, for 
mechanisms generating social obligations for employers to train, thereby transcending the limits 
of a liberal-voluntaristic training regime; and the potentially extremely productive role unions can 
play in generating such obligations. On the basis of what I think I have learned from the German 
case, I would be inclined to predict that where such principles are neglected, skill formation and 
advanced industrial competitiveness will lag behind German (and Japanese) standards.
7. Alow wage spread at a high overall wage level induces employers to distribute their human 
resource investment more evenly. This presupposes relatively low training wages, especially for 
young people—which may or may not be difficult to concede for unions. The narrower the gap 
between training wages and skilled wages, the larger the productive component of a trainee's 
activities at the workplace, as distinguished from its investive, training component
8. While this might appear alien in an American context, it is not so at all. Not long ago 
apprenticeships were a major mechanism of skill formation in the United States. Their rapid 
decline in the recent past derives from the combined effects of de-industrialization, declining real 
wages, and de-unionization, not from a basic incompatibility of externally regulated and stan 
dardized workplace-based training with the American culture.
9. While a low wage spread above a high wage floor creates an incentive for employers to 
train, it may constitute a disincentive for workers to learn. The latter seems to have been one of
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the unanticipated consequences of Swedish "solidary wage policy." Unions taking an active role 
in skill formation will have to search for a "saddle point" where wage differentials are low enough 
for employers to be willing to provide training to the workforce at large, and high enough for 
workers to justify the effort of undergoing training. (To make remaining wage differentials effec 
tive with respect to training, they should to the greatest possible extent be based on knowledge.) 
One would expect that the ideal level of wage differentiation should be found somewhere between 
the extremely high American and the extremely low Swedish wage spread.
10. To advance more comprehensive job demarcations as well as facilitate the move towards 
an ability-based payment system, unions could negotiate higher wages for workers who have 
undergone training, regardless of whether or not their additional qualifications are actually used. 
This will be a strong incentive for managements to reorganize work in such a way that the new 
skills can in fact be utilized—which will in turn make it easier for unions to push for a less frag 
mented work organization. Being forced to use newly generated qualifications by reorganizing 
work so as to accommodate them, managements will be educated about the possibilities and 
advantages of high-wage and high-skill production, and in this way unions may provide further 
training to management in their own long-term interests.
11. That is, where they were given the chance to do so, especially in the Anglo-Saxon coun 
tries. For a variety of reasons, the development was quite different in Germany and Scandinavia. 
Still, the differences are gradual and not categoric, and at least historically the dynamic described 
here was present everywhere.
12. This was the case particularly in Britain where apprenticeship typically deteriorated into 
"lime served," at declining pay differentials between skilled workers and apprentices. As a result 
it almost completely disappeared.
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